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“Our Grief and Anger”: George W. Bush’s Rhetoric
in the Aftermath of 9/11 as Presidential Crisis 
Communication
The Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, were a tragic occur-
rence of a great political signifi cance not only for the United States, but also the 
whole international community. For the Republican administration of George W. 
Bush, who assumed presidency only eight months prior to the disastrous Tuesday 
morning, it was also the fi rst real test of leadership. This paper is an analysis of 
the most important speeches delivered by President Bush in September 2001, at 
the time of the arguably most acute and unanticipated geopolitical crisis of the 
American state since the attack on Pearl Harbor1. Bush’s motivations, political 
goals, and persuasive strategies are discussed in detail in the study, and then col-
lated with an earlier communication of related nature – Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
response to the events of December 7th, 1941. This allows for an insight into the 
transformation of presidential rhetoric in the United States during the almost 60 
years that passed between the two tremendous crises. The paper’s principal claim 
is that Bush’s 2001 communication acts were focused on the emotional and “vi-
sual” qualities of persuasive speech, refl ecting to some degree the changes of the 
United States politics, society, and media in that period.
1. George W. Bush, Politician and Communicator
George Walker Bush was born in 1946 to a family of wealth and privilege in 
New Haven, Connecticut. After graduating from Harvard and Yale and a brief 
military stint, Bush had a business career in the oil industry, before winning 1994 
gubernatorial election in Texas. Six years later, after a controversial presidential 
campaign and a lengthy legal battle, George W. Bush became the 43rd President of 
1. The selection of orations analyzed in this paper was based predominantly on the compilation of President George W. 
Bush’s speeches, created by the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (Selected Speeches of President 
George W. Bush 2001-2008).
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the United States. In contrast with his Northeastern roots and upper-class upbrin-
ging, Bush projected a folksy, cowboy-like aura (not unlike President Reagan), 
bringing him closer to many of his voters; Carlnita Peterson Greene calls it
“a strategy of de-WASPING […] the blue-blooded Bushes” (Greene 2006, 152). 
This ostensible lack of sophistication could be also seen as a deliberate campaign-
ing tactic: matched against experienced debaters such as his 2000 rival Al Gore, 
George W. Bush would win as long as he (more or less) stood his ground and did 
not commit any major blunders, by simply surpassing the public’s expectations of 
him (Gregg II). Throughout his presidency, Bush was routinely presented in the 
media as a person of lesser than heavyweight intellectual capabilities, due, at least 
to some extent, to his frequent unconventional statements and malapropisms, such 
as the neologism “to misunderestimate” (used during a stump speech in Arkansas 
during the 2000 presidential campaign). 
Those bushisms, as they were called by the press, did not, however, prevent the 
Republican from being an effi cient public speaker. While George W. Bush was 
often judged to lack the charisma of a silver-tongued orator (according to James 
A. Barnes of the National Review, Bush was “an uneven communicator […] usu-
ally more effective in a conversational setting than in delivering a formal speech”; 
quoted in Crockett 2003, 436), it can be argued that many of his orations from 
the campaign trail and the White House were perfectly functional, if not always 
spectacular acts of political communication. The Republican’s calm and steady 
performance during the 2000 presidential debates (Novak 2000) was seen as one 
of the factors contributing to his eventual victory in the Electoral College; political 
scientists Robert S. Eriksen and Christopher Wlezien note that Bush gained about 
two points in all debates over his opponent (Eriksen and Wlezien 2012, 81). 
While never having received the same amount of praise and scrutiny as rheto-
rical oeuvres of certain other American presidents, Bush’s oratory (especially his 
communications of the War on Terror era) has nevertheless attracted signifi cant in-
terest from public speaking scholars: John Murphy, for example, attempted to defi -
ne Bush’s post-9/11 speeches in categories of genre, visual character, and creation 
of self and the audience (2003, 608), Kevin Coe explored in detail the effi ciency 
of his oratory in building support for the Iraq war (2011, 307-308), Michael J. Lee 
studied the portrayals of Arabs and Muslim in Bush’s rhetoric (2017, 5), while 
Christian Spielvogel focused on the Republican’s framing of War on Terror in the 
2004 presidential campaign (2005, 557-561). 
2. Initial Responses
The early, fairly uneventful, period of Bush’s presidency ended abruptly on
a sunny Tuesday, September 11th, 2001, when two commercial airliners crashed 
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into the World Trade Center towers in New York City. After several dozen minu-
tes, the two buildings collapsed, one after the other, burying hundreds of people. 
For the fi rst time since a “date that shall live in infamy”2, December 7th, 1941, the 
United States of America fell victim to an attack on home soil. 
The situation George W. Bush found himself in during the early hours of 
September 11th was in every respect diffi cult and associated with a plenitude of 
rhetorical challenges. First, the very magnitude of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, unpre-
cedented in recent history, caused a substantial danger of panic among the U.S. 
population (McQuail 2007, 476-478). The second factor was the initial lack of in-
formation about the identity of the perpetrators, fueling the feeling of uncertainty 
and increasing the risk of all sorts of chaotic reactions from the public. The third 
thing involved the President being still a relative rookie at this stage, having only 
seven years of executive leadership (with six of them as the Governor of Texas) 
under his belt and not being widely known for any particular vision of internatio-
nal policy. The rhetorical goals of the Republican in the days and weeks to come 
after the dreadful morning of September 11th included thus: calming the spirits 
of the nation, restoring the faith in the American leadership at home and abroad, 
and presenting a coherent plan for action, all while maintaining the trust of U.S. 
citizens.
It was already during the fi rst day of the crisis that George W. Bush had several 
occasions to address the nation. He spent the majority of September 11th travelling 
between different secure locations before returning to Washington in the evening 
(the exact number of hijacked airplanes and the risk of associated terrorist acts 
were still unknown at that time so extra precautions were taken). The President’s 
brief remarks were recorded at a Florida elementary school he was visiting during 
the attacks and at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. On both occasions the 
Republican used a familiar, folksy register of language, including his trademark 
bushism “make no mistake”, while the content of his statements refl ected the gro-
wing amount of data gathered by the authorities during the day. Bush confi rmed 
that terrorist attacks took place, assured the audience that the security resources of 
the nation were put to good use, and expressed his sympathy for the victims.
The most important oration of the day was however undoubtedly the president’s 
evening speech, televised from the White House. This solemn effort, while still 
relatively short, was much more elaborate than Bush’s previous communication 
acts, both in form and content. The President starts with an emotional, graphic 
recollection of the dramatic events of the passing day, focusing on their human 
toll. The terrorist attacks are depicted in the speech as acts of evil, giving a moral 
dimension to the nation’s tragedy and allowing for the introduction of one of the 
2. An expression famously used by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor (see below).
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main organizing devices of the oration: the opposition between differing values 
and qualities. “Today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature”, says 
Bush, “and we responded with the best of America” (Bush 2001a). 
The sheer terror of the ferocious attacks is juxtaposed with the strength of the 
nation, the “despicable acts of terror” – with “the brightest beacon for freedom 
and opportunity” (Bush 2001a) that is America, introducing the theme of the
country’s unique virtues (a motif repeated in subsequent speeches3). Using po-
werful metaphors and parallel structures, the orator paints a picture of a nation 
resolute in the face of adversity. The middle part of the speech is composed of 
brief descriptions of the initiatives undertaken by the government in the previous 
several hours, assuring the audience that federal agencies, the military, and emer-
gency teams are working effi ciently to help those who are suffering and avenge 
those who have fallen. Additionally, Bush thanks both U.S. statesmen and world 
leaders for their support, implying that neither his administration nor the United 
States stand alone in this critical moment.
Near the end of the speech, George W. Bush quotes the well-known “valley of 
death” passage from Psalm 23, offering a comforting message to the vast Christian 
majority of his audience (and exploiting to his advantage a rhetorical commonpla-
ce shared with them). The oration closes with yet another opposition: “None of us 
will ever forget this day. Yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good 
and just in the world” (Bush 2001a), reinforcing its good vs. evil theme. It should 
be emphasized that this very motif would soon constitute the core of Bush’s War 
on Terror era rhetoric (e.g. in the expression “axis of evil”, initially used in the 
2002 State of the Union Address; see also: Spielvogel 2005, 557).
On Friday, September 14th, the 43rd President participated in a solemn remem-
brance service held at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C. During the 
ceremony, Bush delivered a brief, eight-minute long oration, with several former 
Presidents and many prominent U.S. offi cials in attendance. The tone used by 
the Republican throughout the speech, given in the national shrine of the United 
States, was dignifi ed and serious, his discourse – inspired by the American homi-
letic tradition. 
George W. Bush begins by acknowledging the amount of suffering of the 
American nation in the aftermath of 9/11. He uses anaphora (“They are the names
of…”) in order to give rhythm to a listing of victims of the terrorist attacks. 
His depiction of the confl ict at hand is based on ethical themes, juxtaposing the
“peaceful” United States with “stealth and deceit and murder”, characterizing the 
hijackers (Bush 2011b). In the middle part of the oration, the Republican enters 
into deliberations of quasi-theological nature, discussing the problem of theodicy: 
3. References to American exceptionalism are a staple of the U.S. political oratory.
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“God’s signs are not always the ones we look for. We learn in tragedy that his pur-
poses are not always our own” (Bush 2001b). He then moves on to focus on the 
virtues of the American people, mentioning several stories of compassion and per-
sonal bravery demonstrated by U.S. citizens in the face of the disaster, only three 
days earlier. Quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt, he calls this response “warm
courage of national unity”, transcending ethnic, denominational, and political dif-
ferences. America, argues Bush in yet another praise of American exceptionalism, 
was targeted for attack since “in every generation the world has produced enemies 
of human freedom” and “we [the United States] are freedom’s home and defender” 
(Bush 2001b). The oration ends with a direct address to God: “May He bless the 
souls of the departed”, states Bush in a parallel concluding structure, “May He 
comfort our own. And may He always guide our country” (Bush 2001b).
One of the most iconic media images of 2001 depicted President Bush stan-
ding on the rubble of the World Trade Center. The Republican visited the site 
of the terrorist attacks merely hours after attending the remembrance service in 
the National Cathedral; the contrast between both rhetorical venues could not be
greater. His goal was to boost the morale of the emergency teams working at 
Ground Zero and to indicate to Americans everywhere that the federal administra-
tion is active and effi cient in coordinating the rescue operations. Encouraged by 
enthusiastic reception at the site, Bush grabbed a megaphone and delivered an im-
provised speech targeted at fi re fi ghters and fi rst responders standing around him.
“The Bullhorn Speech” (Bush 2001c), as that was the name under which Bush’s 
oration entered the political discourse, went on to become one of the proudest mo-
ments of the Republican’s presidency4, highlighting the signifi cance of non-verbal 
communication, rapport with the audience, as well as choosing the correct time and 
place for an orator’s success. Perhaps the most striking quality of the Republican’s 
speech concerns how rhetorical ethos was created for and by the speaker on this 
occasion. While the President of the United States gets an enormous amount of 
personal credibility just because of his position as the most powerful person on 
the planet, Bush’s rhetorical assets were further boosted in this particular case by 
his very appearance on the debris of the World Trade Center – in a moment when 
the whole nation, still shell-shocked from what happened only three days earlier, 
compulsively watching 24/7 news channels in a state of eerie disbelief, was de-
sperately clinging to any notion of hope and sense, and a leader to gather around. 
At Ground Zero, Bush was wearing a grey bomber jacket and dark blue je-
ans, instead of a fancy suit associated with the ivory towers of federal govern-
ment institutions. He was making the most of his “average Joe” charisma and 
4. Years later, a photo of President Bush holding a bullhorn on the debris of the World Trade Center was used for the in-
side cover of his memoir “Decision Points”. The megaphone itself is now an exhibit at the George W. Bush Presidential 
Library and Museum in Dallas, Texas.
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conversational skills, chatting casually and shaking hands, apparently comfortable 
in the “people’s champion” role. When offered a bullhorn, he hugged a fi reman 
(an FDNY veteran named Bob Beckwith) standing nearby and started speaking. 
The content of the Republican’s brief remarks is not unusual or very signifi cant 
here indeed: Bush talks about the unity of the American people and thanks the 
fi rst responders for their service and sacrifi ce. The oration is interrupted several 
times by loud cheering and chanting (“U.S.A.! U.S.A.!”, “God bless America!”). 
What is important, however, is a moment of rhetorical brilliance from George 
W. Bush, perfectly showcasing his abilities as a quick-thinking, mindful public 
speaker. Thirty-six seconds into the speech, one of the rescue workers, apparently 
unable to discern the words of the oration due to inadequate amplifi cation, shouts 
to the President “I can’t hear you!”. Bush immediately responds by saying: “I can 
hear you! I can hear you! The rest of the world hears you! And the people, and the 
people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon!” (Bush 2001e), 
gracefully moving to the main themes of the speech: appreciation of the rescuers 
and restoring justice. His words unleash a huge wave of applause from the crowd.
It might be argued that the audience member’s spontaneous reaction unlocked 
the true rhetorical potential of the 43rd President, instantly transforming the situ-
ation from a public (“one-to-many”) speech to a more intimate (“one-to-one”), 
interpersonal conversation, in which Bush has always genuinely thrived. Unlike 
many other orators5, whose forte was communicating to large crowds, George W. 
Bush was much more at ease when talking to individual persons, drawing rheto-
rical ethos from his personal credibility as a normal guy, a man able to empathize 
with the common people and understand their problems and aspirations. It can be 
also speculated that the fi rst responders’ enthusiastic reception of the Republican 
at Ground Zero boosted his confi dence (perhaps for the fi rst time after three extre-
mely diffi cult, agonizing days “in offi ce”), allowing Bush to relax enough to go off 
book and show his true rhetorical colors.
Years after the delivery of the Bullhorn Speech, it is still remembered as one 
of the defi ning events in Bush’s political career. Reminiscing about the speech, 
Kenneth T. Walsh of the U.S. News & World Report wrote in 2013: 
“It was George W. Bush's ‘bullhorn moment’, one of the most riveting and important points in his 
presidency, illustrating the personal qualities he was most proud of: a pride in making decisions 
from the gut, an overwhelming trust in his instincts, a certain brio in how he conducted himself 
during a crisis. […] Bush's spontaneity and his instinctive way of making decisions didn't look 
so appealing as the war on terror escalated […] but on Sept. 14, 2001, Bush found his voice as a 
leader during a crucial and dangerous time” (Walsh). 
5. For example, Richard Nixon is often regarded to have been a socially awkward introvert, feeling comfortable only 
in his close circle of friends and family, who nonetheless was able to perfectly mask his insecurities and transform into 
a formidable public speaker whenever it was needed (Bochin 1990, 85).
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3. War on Terror Address
The most important political consequence of the terrorist attack on America 
was, without any doubt, the War on Terror – an international military campaign 
announced by President Bush in a speech delivered on September 20th, 2001, be-
fore the Joint Houses of the U.S. Congress. Given more than a week after the 
tragic Tuesday morning, the oration was designed as the offi cial response of the 
American government to the events of 9/11. The audience for the speech included 
not only Senators, Congressmen, and other high-ranking members of the American 
government, but also foreign dignitaries and numerous special guests. Millions of 
people, in the United States and all over the world, watched the landmark oration 
broadcast live on television. Compared to the previously analyzed communication 
acts, the September 20th speech was much longer (nearly 40 minutes); it was also 
interrupted numerous times with applause (including several instances of standing 
ovation from the audience). The rhetorical goals of George W. Bush included buil-
ding political support at home and abroad for a military retaliatory action and fur-
ther reinvigoration of the nation’s moods at that diffi cult time. In the spirit of the 
harmony of rhetorical genres, Bush’s oration combined epideictic, deliberative, 
and forensic elements, with the ceremonial (epideictic) aspects coming to the fore 
(similarly as in the case of his other 9/11 communications; Murphy 2003, 609).
The exordium, or the introductory part, of the oration was presented in a lofty, 
pathos-heavy style. Thanks to a witty play on words, George W. Bush was able to 
begin the speech with a strong, eloquent opening: 
“In the normal course of events, presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the 
Union6. Tonight, no such report is needed; it has already been delivered by the American people. 
[…] My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of 
Union, and it is strong” (Bush 2001d). 
Using memorable examples of several rhetorical devices, including anadiplosis 
(“Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution”) and antithesis (“Whether 
we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be 
done; Bush 2001d), George W. Bush gives the fi rst hint about a planned military 
operation. He then thanks the people of the world for their support in the face of 
the disastrous events of 9/11: 
6. The State of the Union address is an annual message delivered by the President of the United States to the Congress 
at the beginning of a year.
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“America will never forget the sounds of our national anthem playing at Buckingham Palace, on 
the streets of Paris and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate. We will not forget South Korean children 
gathering to pray outside our embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque 
in Cairo. We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and 
Latin America” (Bush 2001d). 
Special words of appreciation go to Prime Minister Tony Blair, foreshadowing 
future involvement of the United Kingdom in the War on Terror coalition. Among 
other guests mentioned by name are not only U.S. offi cials, whose support and 
unity in the face of crisis are praised by the orator, but also a very special person: 
Lisa Beamer, the widow of Todd Beamer – one of the heroic passengers of Flight 
93. Acknowledging her presence in the audience (as the fi rst person in attendance 
to receive such a mention) is of course a part of a rhetorical strategy of presenting 
a wider problem through a prism of an individual tragedy (i.e. putting a “human 
face” on an issue) for greater emotional appeal7.
The goal of the second part of a classic rhetorical speech, narratio, is to give 
the audience some background knowledge to better understand the argument of 
the speaker. George W. Bush commences this section of the oration by recalling 
the events of September 11th, extensively using parallel structures to emphasize 
the scale of the attacks. He then goes on to reveal the fi ndings of American agen-
cies responsible for the 9/11 investigation, pointing out to Al-Qaeda, Osama bin 
Laden, and the Taliban regime, harboring terrorists in Afghanistan. His description 
of the subversive organization uses easily comprehensible comparisons and me-
taphors for clarity: “Al-Qaeda is to terror what the Mafi a is to crime. But its goal is 
not making money, its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs 
on people everywhere” (Bush 2001d) and focuses on details of the bizarre policies 
of the group.
Having explained the nature of the terrorist threat to the United States, the pre-
sident moves on to the crux of his argument, addressing the Taliban directly and 
presenting a list of demands, including “delivering to United States authorities all 
of the leaders of Al-Qaeda who hide in [their] land” and “closing immediately and 
permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan” (Bush 2001d). The ora-
tor puts an emphasis on the gravity of the situation, announcing in a distinct and 
serious manner: “These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The 
Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they 
will share in their fate” (Bush 2001d).
What is signifi cant, however, is that George W. Bush exercises utmost care to 
accentuate the differences between the extremist Al-Qaeda and the vast majority 
of the Islamic community: 
7. As in the saying: “A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic”, sometimes falsely attributed to the 
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.
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“I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It's 
practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America 
counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of 
Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, 
to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many 
Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports 
them” (Bush 2001d). 
The emphasis put on this distinction by George W. Bush is partly strategic in 
nature: failure to do so could antagonize Muslim people everywhere against the 
United States and hinder the chances of future anti-terrorist initiatives (see also: 
Lee 2017, 7-9). In the next minutes of the oration, the Republican elaborates on 
the philosophy of Al-Qaeda, comparing it to the totalitarian doctrines of the past 
and condemning it to “history's unmarked grave of discarded lies” (a glorifi ed, 
more lyrical reference to Ronald Reagan’s “ash heap of history”, known from his 
Westminster Address of 1982).
The second half of the speech starts with a lengthy presentation of initiatives 
undertaken or planned by the U.S. government in order to fi ght terrorism, and 
people chosen to head those enterprises. In the rhetorical tradition of Churchill’s 
“blood, toil, tears and sweat”, the 43rd President tries not to offer false hopes or 
easy solutions to his audience, yet he vigorously expresses his confi dence about 
the fi nal victory. Meanwhile, the people of the United States are simply asked by 
Bush to restore the American way of life that the terrorists conspired to destroy. 
The fi nishing section, or peroratio, brings more pathos. The orator underlines 
the historical role America has to take in the new global circumstances and assu-
res the audience of the strength of the American resolve. Coming to the end of 
the oration, Bush looks to the future, acknowledging that “We’ll go back to our 
lives and routines and that is good. Even grief recedes with time and grace”. The 
determination of the American people, however, must not pass, as “Each of us 
will remember what happened that day and to whom it happened. […] Some will 
remember an image of a fi re or story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face 
and a voice gone forever” (Bush 2001d). 
Here, the 43rd President approaches the boldest and most risky part of his speech. 
Reaching into a pocket of his jacket, he takes out a police offi cer’s badge, saying: 
“And I will carry this. It is the police shield of a man named George Howard who 
died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his 
mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. It is my reminder of lives that ended 
and a task that does not end” (Bush 2001d). Let us focus on what happened here: 
not only does George W. Bush employ the “personal tragedy” strategy again, but 
he also uses an actual prop (!) to intensify the emotional appeal of his story. 
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In the last few sentences of the speech, George W. Bush continues the argument 
of an eternal dualistic struggle between good and evil; a motif reminiscent of many 
other successful rhetorical endeavors from the past, such as Ronald Reagan’s “Evil 
Empire” speech. In the landmark 1983 oration, Reagan – speaking in front of
a very peculiar audience (members of the National Association of Evangelicals) 
– presented an unorthodox interpretation of international relations of that time, 
drawing heavily from the Holy Scripture and Christian apologetic sources (such 
as C. S. Lewis’s “The Screwtape Letters”), and depicting the arms reduction con-
fl ict between the United States and the Soviet Union along strictly ethical lines, in 
order to consolidate the support of his electoral base for the foreign policy initia-
tives of his administration (Kuś 2019, 27-42). In his 9/11 oratory, Bush attempted 
to do much the same8, but since he was – most of the time – communicating with
a wildly more diversifi ed audience, his argument was stripped of Reagan’s evan-
gelical overtones and focused on the universal themes of good and evil instead (as 
in the above-mentioned metaphor of “axis of evil”).
The 43rd President’s conviction that the righteous side will eventually prevail 
is legitimized by a reference to the Supreme Being, giving the oration a powerful 
and optimistic ending: “The course of this confl ict is not known, yet its outcome 
is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we 
know that God is not neutral between them” (Bush 2001d).
4. Bush’s 9/11 Response v. Roosevelt’s “Date That Will Live in Infamy”
In order to better understand the characteristics of Bush’s rhetorical endeavors
in the aftermath of the WTC disaster, it is worthwhile to look at them from
a broader perspective. Traumatic as they were, the events of September 11th have 
not marked the only time when America was insidiously attacked by a foreign 
power. The most notorious of such occurrences, the Japanese sneak offensive of 
December 7th, 1941, was arguably a similar shock for the United States society 
and required a comparable reaction from the nation’s authorities. However, whi-
le President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Congress oration of December 8th evidently 
served purposes analogous to Bush’s post-9/11 communications, it might be argu-
ed that the instruments employed by both leaders differed in many respects. 
The 32nd President of the United States was himself a renowned orator and 
a pioneer in using electronic media for gathering support (his “Fireside Chats” 
revolutionized American political communication in the 1930s; Yu 2005, 90), with 
8. As a sign of things to come, for this perspective dominated the Republican administration’s portrayals of the War 
on Terrorism era confl icts, no doubt due to its usefulness and effi cacy in domestic politics, Christian Spielvogel argues 
that “Bush's good-versus-evil frame functioned as a ritual expression, test, and affi rmation of conservative morality” 
(Spielvogel 2005, 552).
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several of his speeches having a lasting impact on the public discourse and national 
ideological imagery. The most famous rhetorical effort of the Democrat, however, 
was arguably his December 8th, 1941, message, delivered to a joint session of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives less than 24 hours after receiving news of 
the attack of the Empire of Japan armed forces on the American naval facilities at 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The solemn and brief oration (Roosevelt spoke for six and 
a half minutes only) achieved its purpose as it led to a declaration of war between 
the United States and Japan being issued by the Congress. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s speech begins with the notorious words “yesterday, 
December 7th, 1941, a date which will live in infamy”, conveying the notion of 
the historical signifi cance of the events of that day. In the following passages, the 
32nd President presents a sober and detailed account of the diplomatic and military 
proceedings of the previous hours, emphasizing the fact that in spite of continuing 
negotiations between the governments, the very logistics of the offensive “make it 
obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago”. 
Presenting the Empire’s recent advances in Pacifi c, FDR consistently utilizes a pa-
rallel structure: “Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack aga-
inst Malaya. Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night Japanese 
forces attacked Guam. Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands. 
Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island. And this morning the Japanese at-
tacked Midway Island”, creating a mental picture of the Imperial forces striding 
incessantly eastwards. The danger is coming closer and closer to the U.S. ma-
inland, as even “American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas 
between San Francisco and Honolulu”. This rhetorical strategy of using dry in-
formation to evoke terror and anger is perhaps best summarized by the Democrat 
himself in one of subsequent sentences: “the facts of yesterday and today speak for 
themselves”. It is only in the last one third of the oration that Roosevelt’s rhetoric 
becomes more fi ery and pathetic, with his words conveying growing condemna-
tion of the Empire of Japan’s actions. The President asserts that he is expressing 
the will of the American people in the denunciation of the Pearl Harbor “treache-
ry” and “onslaught”, assures the audience of the “inevitable triumph” of America’s 
armed forces and God’s assistance for them, and asks the Congress to declare war 
against the Japanese on the grounds of their “unprovoked and dastardly attack”.
Comparing Roosevelt’s address to Bush’s post-9/11 oratory, it should be em-
phasized that while both rhetorical situations included alike elements (such as the 
historical circumstances, the speakers’ goals, general characteristics of audien-
ces), the strategies employed by the Democrat and the Republican were very diffe-
rent. The most important distinction involved the persuasive appeals used in their 
communication acts. Although both orators adhered to the old principle of combi-
ning different types of arguments into a coherent, effective whole, the proportions 
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between logos, pathos, and ethos differed signifi cantly between the two analyzed 
cases. In his December 8th speech, Franklin D. Roosevelt utilized a textbook lo-
gical approach, drawing persuasive power from a precise, rather dispassionate 
presentation of facts, and a rational, easy-to-follow analysis of relations between 
the discussed events: since the preparation of an offensive of Pearl Harbor magni-
tude evidently required plenty of time, the Japanese government must have acted 
insincerely in their recent diplomatic conversations; since the Japanese attacks are 
happening closer and closer to Western coast of the United States, there is a clear 
and present danger menacing the whole American nation, etc. George W. Bush, 
as evidenced in the examples discussed above, was a champion of a different 
strategy; he focused more on pathos and ethos, emphasizing emotional imagery 
(“Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever” [Bush 2001d]), 
using personal charisma as a focal point for the community to gather around
(“I can hear you! I can hear you! The rest of the world hears you!” [Bush 2001c]), 
and not shying away from mawkish gimmicks to amplify the impact of his words, 
such as in the case of the fallen offi cer’s badge gambit.
Another difference between the two rhetorical styles involves the inherently 
visual quality of George W. Bush’s oratory as opposed to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
address. The ekphrastic aspects of the Republican’s speeches can be clearly –
nomen omen – seen in several of his communication acts of the 9/11 era, drawing 
persuasive power from vivid, elaborate portrayals of events, concepts, and issues 
being discussed. Examples from among the orations analyzed in this paper include 
passages such as his recount of the morning of September 11th: “the pictures of 
airplanes fl ying into buildings, fi res burning, huge structures collapsing have fi lled 
us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger” (Bush 2001a), 
a memorable depiction of sympathetic reactions from the people of the world, 
offering a series of evocative visual snippets of distant places (as quoted abo-
ve [Bush 2001d]), and colorful metaphors, instantly evoking imagery from the 
American cinematographic tradition: “Al-Qaeda is to terror what the Mafi a is to 
crime” (Bush 2001d). Franklin D. Roosevelt, on the other hand, while a master of 
presenting complex problems in an accessible and suggestive manner (as eviden-
ced not only in the December 8th speech, but e.g. in his ingenious classifi cation of 
the “Four Freedoms” in the 1941 State of the Union Address, as well as the many 
radio broadcasts on New Deal policies he made since 1933) and devising clever, 
catchy slogans (e.g. “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself” from his fi rst
inaugural speech), was never known for an exceptional vividness of his style, 
generally aiming for the clarity and precision instead, working on concepts rather 
than representations. Risking an obvious major oversimplifi cation (and the dan-
ger of being ironically carried away with visual metaphors), it might actually 
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be argued that one of the differences between Roosevelt’s December 8th, 1941 
Pearl Harbor address and Bush’s September 20th, 2011 speech can be compared to
a contrast between an expertly done infographic or a fl ow chart and an epic pain-
ting (or at least an illustrated magazine pictorial). 
The question remains whether the differences between Roosevelt’s and Bush’s 
oratories are caused by the idiosyncratic qualities of the two statesmen themselves 
or some other factors and circumstances. After all, George W. Bush’s affi nity for 
visual arts is well known – in retirement, the former president took up painting as 
a hobby with some considerable (if not exactly spectacular) results. Still, it might 
be argued that this apparent shift in presidential rhetoric stems from fundamental 
changes of the American political communication and media system that happened 
over the decades. Whereas the 32nd President’s times marked the end of the pre-
ponderance of textual communication in politics (FDR’s last presidential election 
in 1944 was also the last one not to be covered by television networks), Bush’s era 
in the White House coincided with the bloom of analog visual broadcasting, with 
the 24/7 news channels incessantly shelling the audience with pictures. It can be 
therefore asserted that the Republican was speaking to an audience already con-
ditioned to be sensitive to images and actually expecting the orator to adjust his 
words to the visually rich media environment of modern times. The vividness of 
the 43rd President’s oratory might also be seen as a way of building a connection 
with the listeners (not unlike Kennedy’s famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” maneu-
ver), since virtually all of them experienced the dramatic events of September 11th 
through televised images. Bush’s apparent penchant for emotional and personal 
appeals (when compared to FDR's) should also be understood in the wider con-
text of the changing patterns of political communication in the U.S. Ever since 
the famous 1960 Kennedy-Nixon presidential debate, commentators observed the 
increasing role of personality and charisma in American electoral politics. What 
once was a clash of ideas, nowadays becomes often a contest of meticulously 
cultivated public images and associated emotions, with the candidates being mar-
keted like commercial products (as in the title of a famous Nixon-era campaign 
memoir, Joe McGinnis’s “The Selling of the President”). Canadian media theorist 
Marshall McLuhan wrote already in 1968 that “Policies and issues are useless for 
election purposes, since they are too specialized and too hot. The shaping of the 
candidate’s integral image has taken the place of discussing confl icting points of 
view” (McLuhan 1968, 134). Therefore, it is little wonder that modern political 
communication, including presidential rhetoric, operates more on the emotional 
and personal planes, oftentimes leaving logical argumentation behind.
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5. Conclusion
While the popular image of President Bush was never that of an inspiring pu-
blic speaker in the mold of John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, or Barack Obama,
a closer examination of his most successful rhetorical endeavors in the initial sta-
ges of the War on Terror era suggests that this lack of recognition is perhaps unfair. 
George W. Bush was a no-nonsense orator who preferred substance over style, re-
lied primarily on rapport with his listeners, was always willing to adjust his messa-
ge in order to amplify its persuasive power, and did not shy away from using uncon-
ventional tactics to achieve his goals or even going off book if the circumstances 
demanded it. The above analysis of his post-9/11 communication acts, revealing 
Bush’s extensive use of pathos and ethos appeals as well as his penchant for vi-
sually creative imagery, is not only a description of the Republican’s rhetorical 
modus operandi, but also a statement on the changing media environment in the 
United States, requiring specifi c skill sets from today’s political operators.
George W. Bush, whose popularity skyrocketed after 9/11, exceeding 90% ap-
proval rating in the autumn of 2001, was able to skillfully use this momentum 
to push forward many of his political initiatives (Coe 2011, 321); even some of 
his future harshest critics, such as then Senator Hillary Clinton, were suffi ciently 
under the spell of the 43rd President’s War on Terror rhetoric to support his inter-
national policies (including voting for the authorization of the invasion of Iraq). 
Bush’s public image of an anti-terrorism champion proved to be more than enough 
to carry him through the 2004 presidential race (even against John Kerry’s gene-
rally competent campaign), but eventually this attractive veneer started to grow 
thin and peel off. Just like in the case of another of the great 20th century orators, 
Richard Nixon, who was not able to repeat the success of his 1952 Checkers speech 
in the course of the Watergate proceedings (Bochin 1990, 263), the Republican’s 
political communication strategies did not seem to work that effi ciently during 
the subsequent crises of his presidency, including the 2005 Katrina disaster and 
the 2008 economic recession (which saw him hit rock-bottom approval ratings). 
Nevertheless, it might be argued that an enduring proof of the 43rd President’s 
unorthodox rhetorical ingenuity and signifi cance as a public speaker is the fact 
that some of the expressions coined and popularized in his communication acts 
(“war on terror”, “axis of evil”) still infl uence our understanding of global politics.
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